最新杏吧原创

ST. LOUIS 鈥� A series of failures, from a misunderstood comment to equipment problems, left the city unable to activate tornado sirens before a deadly storm hit in May, according to a consultant鈥檚 report released Monday.

The city鈥檚 emergency management staffers were at an off-site workshop and away from the agency鈥檚 siren equipment when the tornado hit, despite early storm warnings. Communication then broke down between the emergency management chief and a fire dispatcher who could have triggered the sirens. Even if the dispatcher had tried to trigger the sirens, the equipment that activates the sirens was likely not working. And even if it had worked, some sirens in the path of the tornado wouldn鈥檛 have gone off because they were broken.

The report found 鈥渕ultiple cascading failures at almost every level leading up to and even after the storm event,鈥� wrote law firm Carmody MacDonald, which conducted the review.

Mayor Cara Spencer, who took office in mid-April, acknowledged the problems in a statement accompanying the report鈥檚 release. 鈥淭his investigation makes it clear that there were breakdowns on several levels,鈥� she said. 鈥淚 am committed to putting this report to work so the City of 最新杏吧原创 can respond at the highest possible levels in any future disaster.鈥�

The report offers the fullest review yet of city failures in response to the storm that killed five people, injured 38 and damaged thousands of buildings. And while many of the problems listed in the report were already known, it elaborates on some and highlights a few new details 鈥� the day before the tornado, for instance, a test of the siren system determined 22 of the 60 sirens in the city weren鈥檛 working, including some in Forest Park and neighborhoods just north and east of there, where the tornado struck.

But the report also shows progress in fixing some of the biggest issues: The siren system, for example, now automatically activates when the National Weather Service issues alerts, limiting the risk of human error. And the city has fixed the signal relay equipment, plus many of the broken sirens.

Still, it puts a point on the human failures, notably singling out Sarah Russell, the head of the City Emergency Management Agency placed on leave after the storm. It says Russell failed to update emergency response plans as needed, dwells on Russell鈥檚 decision to remain at the workshop 鈥� and away from the city鈥檚 only reliable siren button 鈥� during the storm, and criticizes her leadership afterward.

鈥淲e were also troubled,鈥� investigators said, 鈥渂y Commissioner Russell鈥檚 refusal during her interview to recognize the multiple failures or to take any personal responsibility for them.鈥�

Russell could not immediately be reached for comment Monday evening.

The problems with the sirens were apparent almost as soon as the tornado fizzled out.

Many people, including the loved ones of those who had died, said they couldn鈥檛 hear the city鈥檚 sirens go off. Within hours, a Spencer spokesman said the city was looking into the matter.

Conflicting accounts dribbled out over the following days. The day after the storm, Russell, the city鈥檚 emergency management chief, suggested some sirens had in fact gone off. Two days later, Spencer said that wasn鈥檛 true, and that a 鈥渉uman failure鈥� to push the siren button had occurred.

A day later, Spencer put Russell on leave, citing some of the issues investigators found, like CEMA staff being at a workshop, and the miscommunication between Russell and the dispatcher.

The report, released Monday afternoon, continues in detail: As the weather worsened, a staffer asked Russell if one of them should return to their office and the siren button, only to have Russell decide to stay.

When the National Weather Service issued the tornado warning, neither CEMA nor the fire department took charge of the sirens. Russell called the fire department and asked a dispatcher, 鈥淵ou got the sirens?鈥�

But the dispatcher thought Russell was asking if she had received a cell phone alert, investigators said. She said yes, and made no move with the sirens.

鈥淕iven the gravity of the situation, both Dispatcher Erricka Moorehead and Commissioner Russell should have ensured clarity in their communications,鈥� they said.

The report said a clearer policy would have also helped: Investigators said fire and CEMA staff had several different opinions on who exactly bore responsibility for making sure sirens went off. In the days after the storm, Spencer assigned responsibility to the fire department.

Investigators also detail other findings.

When the fire department tested its siren system after the storm, it failed. When contractors came out to fix it, they found that the fire department鈥檚 antenna couldn鈥檛 reach a device called a repeater, located at a South Side police station, that sends signals to the sirens 鈥� so there was no way to reach them during the storm.

And after the storm hit, the report says, Russell drove through the affected area to conduct a 鈥渨indshield assessment鈥� 鈥� a task usually handled by police officers 鈥� rather than going to the city鈥檚 emergency operations center to coordinate the city鈥檚 response. And when everyone arrived, there was no formal response plan available to guide damage assessment, expense tracking and other parts of the response.

Key protocols were left by the wayside, investigators said, 鈥渓eading to widespread confusion, disorganization, and operational breakdown across CEMA and among responding agencies.鈥�

The report said the city is improving: A contractor brought the siren system back online within a week, and set it up to automatically activate based on weather alerts. The 22 broken sirens are getting fixed; just nine remain as of Friday.

The city is also about to refurbish the entire system.

鈥淭he project will make the entire system functional and reliable in ways it has not been for years,鈥� the report says.

Investigators said more needs to be done, though.

Among other things, they said the city should test each of its siren buttons regularly, and have tests audited annually.

It said the city鈥檚 emergency response plan, last updated in 2003, should be updated regularly.

And it recommended that whenever bad weather is expected, at least one CEMA employee should be in the office during business hours.